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Although eyewitness identification is a highly regarded form of
evidence in criminal trials, its inaccuracy has not gone unnoticed. Justice
Brennan noted in United States v. Wade' that
[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the
annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken iden-
tification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: 'What is the worth
of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The
identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The
hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable
number of instances in the records of English and American
trials. These instances are recent-not due to the brutalities of
ancient criminal procedure.
2
Yet the positive testimony of an eyewitness, the sole observer of the
alleged criminal act, has traditionally been very influential in convincing
the jury of the defendant's guilt.
Although the point is debated by legal commentators, it appears that
juries are naturally apt to give much more weight to the identification of a
criminal defendant by eyewitness testimony than to almost any other kind
of evidence. This is a natural result of the layman's distrust of circum-
stantial evidence . The jury is not hesitant to render a guilty verdict when
confronted with a positive identification by an apparently honest indi-
vidual.
The United States Congress is so strongly supportive of eyewitness
testimony that a portion of Title Two of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act declares that all eyewitness testimony is admissible as
evidence.' Recent research, primarily by psychologists, but also by legal
1. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2. Id. at 228.
3. Comment, Possible Procedural Safeguards Against Mistaken Identification by
Eyewitnesses, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 552, 552 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Possible Procedural
Safeguards].
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1968) enacted as part of Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Street Act (82 Stat. 211) provides as follows:
scholars, indicates, however, that eyewitness testimony is not as reliable
as most jurors assume.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the fallibility of sense percep-
tion and memory and the effect of improper influence6 in a series of cases
commonly referred to as the Wade trilogy.7 In these cases the Court
attempted to describe the dangers of excessive reliance on eyewitness
testimony and fashioned rules calculated to reduce the possibility of an
unjust conviction founded on eyewitness identification. These decisions,
which establish some constitutional safeguards in the area of eyewitness
identification, have been the subject of extensive analysis.' These safe-
guards apply only when the police use a lineup, a showup (the presenta-
tion of the suspect alone to the eyewitness), or a photographic identifica-
tion procedure.9 This comment will analyze the use of expert testimony at
trial and the various elements that can affect the reliability of an eyewit-
ness. It will also examine the courts' traditional approaches to eyewitness
testimony and the legal ramifications of suggested alternatives. In the
analysis of these alternative solutions emphasis will be placed on the legal
effect and value of engaging an expert to explain factors of perception to
the jury.
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the
commission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be admissible in
evidence in a criminal prosecution in any trial court ordained and established under
article III of the Constitution of the United States.
Federal courts have ignored this statute, and consequently it is more an expression of a
legislative hope than a binding rule of decision. See McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation
and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 249 (1970). Commentators
believe that the statute is constitutionally invalid. Strict adherence to the statute would
assure that in-court identification may always be made, regardless of the type of pretrial
confrontation between defendant and witness. This appears to be in direct conflict with the
constitutional requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See, e.g., Note, Survey of Title
1I: Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 157 (1968); Note,
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1392
(1969); Comment, Title I1 of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study of the Interaction of Law and
Politics, 48 NEB. L. REV. 193 (1968).
5. Dr. Robert Buckhout, a noted psychologist in the field of perception and sensa-
tion, states,
Eyewitness testimony is unreliable. Research and courtroom experience provide
ample evidence that an eyewitness to a crime is being asked to be something and do
something that a normal human being was not created to be or do. Human
perception is sloppy and uneven, albeit remarkably effective in serving our need to
create structure out of experience. In an investigation or in court, however, a
witness is often asked to play the role of a kind of tape recorder on whose tape the
events of the crime have left an impression.
Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 23 (Dec. 1974).
6. Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification
Cases, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 135, 157 (1971).
7. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on
the Abuse of Pre-trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261 (1971);
Comment, No Panacea: Constitutional Supervision of Eyewitness Identification, 62 J. CRiM.
L.C. & P.S. 363 (1971); Comment, The Rights to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in
the Lower Courts, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 830 (1969).
9. N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 4
(1972).
II. Background
The Anglo-American system of criminal jurisprudence is ideally
founded on a presumption of innocence. Such a system must be self-
regulating to minimize the dangers of convicting an innocent man, a
problem common to every civilized system of justice. ' The ultimate goal
of this system is to protect the innocent, while still effecting a just result.
Although eyewitness testimony has traditionally been assumed accurate,
the problems that such testimony poses must be constantly reconsidered
and reevaluated in light of these objectives, especially because of the
impressive advances made by psychologists in the area of perception. I"
The difficulties in this area of the law were judicially recognized as
early as the nineteenth century.
There are few more difficult subjects with which the ad-
ministration of justice has to deal. The carelessness or superfi-
ciality of observers, the rarity of powers of graphic description,
and the different force with which peculiarities of form or color
or expression strike different persons, make recognition or
identification one of the least reliable of facts testified to even
by actual witnesses who have seen the parties in question; and
where they have not, there is the added obstacle of the inadequ-
acy of language to describe the minute variations of features
and color which go to make up the individual personality. 2
Legal commentators noted the failings of eyewitness testimony over forty
years ago, 13 but psychological research on perception at that time was
inconclusive. Since then, however, psychological advances have consis-
tently demonstrated the fallibility of such evidence. Notwithstanding this
achievement, the criminal justice system has continued to rely heavily on
eyewitness evidence. As a result, misidentification, is "[p]erhaps...
the major cause of known wrongful convictions." 1 4 Numerous cases of
misidentification and subsequent conviction of innocent defendants have
been well documented.
15
10. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 192).
I1. Psychological research on human perception has advanced from the nineteenth
century recording-machine analogy to a more complex understanding of selective decision-
making processes. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 31. See also Fishman, Some Current Research
Needs in the Psychology of Testimony, 13 J. SOC. ISSNER No. 2, 60, 67 (1957).
12. Bryant's Estate, 176 Pa. 309, 318, 35 A. 571, 577 (1896). The court's acknowl-
edgement of the fallibility of eyewitness identification in a civil case implies that it should be
recognized in a criminal case.
13. See, e.g., H. BURrT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1931); D. MCCARTHY, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
THE LAWYER (1929); J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF (3d ed. 1937); Gorphe,
Showing Prisoners to Witnesses for Identification, I AM. J. POLICE SCI. 79 (1930).
14. Quinn, supra note 6 at 135 (quoting J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61 (1957)).
See also E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); H. WILDER & B. WENTWORTH,
PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (1918).
15. See, e.g., TIME, April 2, 1973, at 59 (report of two mistaken identifications of an
assistant district attorney and a sanitation department chauffeur). See also Q. REYNOLDS,
COURTROOM (1950); J. FRANK & B. FRANK, supra note 14; E. GARDNER, THE COURT OF LAST
RESORT (1952); J. WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 250-253 (2d ed. 1937); G.
WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT (3d ed. 1963). See also Duke v. State, 260 Ind. 638, 298
N.E.2d 453 (1973), in which a police officer positively identified one of the two men sitting
Professor Borchard offers convincing evidence of misidentification
in his analysis of the convictions of sixty-five innocent men. Not surpris-
ingly, twenty-nine of the innocent men were found guilty because of
misidentification, even though they were identified by a total of 140
witnesses, almost five each, and two of them by seventeen witnesses
each.' 6 These figures apply to discovered wrongful convictions and
illustrate the problem, but barely indicate its extent. It is impossible to
estimate the number of wrongfully convicted persons whose innocence is
never established. 7 Therefore, the protection of the innocent must be
afforded before any verdict is returned by a poorly informed jury.
[T]he probative effect of identification testimony warrants
precautionary measures to guarantee to the fullest extent its
reliability. Mistakes in circumstantial evidence, though harm-
ful, will usually be less decisive than mistakes in identification
testimony by a good-faith eyewitness. 8
Eyewitness testimony can be highly damaging to any suspect, and mis-
identification, when given positively and convincingly, can have a catas-
trophic result for an innocent suspect. 19 Moreover, conviction of an
innocent person necessarily means that the actual criminal remains free.
The risks inherent in eyewitness testimony are multiplied because
Anglo-American jurisprudence has accepted the "one-witness" rule and
has declined to adhere to the canon and civil law traditions requiring a
greater number of witnesses or corroboration by extrinsic evidence.20 A
court may, however, refuse to permit a criminal case to go to the jury
even though a single eyewitness has positively identified the defendant
when, upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, there is a
at the defense counsel's table. The man identified was not the defendant charged with the
crime as later shown by fingerprints of the true criminal.
A recent ploy attempted by a nervy defense counsel reported in the Harrisburg Patriot,
Sept. 23, 1977, at 28, col. 2, further illustrates the possibility of wrongful conviction. In the
case reported, defense counsel had a model sit next to him at the defense table and,
following positive identification by three prosecution witnesses, the real defendant stood up
in the audience and removed a disguise. The ultimate decision nevertheless resulted in
conviction of the true criminal defendant who had been sitting in the audience at the time the
eyewitness identified the model.
16. E. BORCHARD, supra note 14, at XIII.
17. Id. at XIX. Borchard explains there are four principal ways to uncover such
errors:
(1) In the case of peculiarly original crimes, by their continued perpetration
after the wrong man is in custody;
(2) By the corroborated confession of guilty persons or of prosecuting wit-
nesses;
(3) By the substantiated confession of one or more accomplices in a joint
venture; and
(4) By sheer good luck when the police, the prosecutor, or the governor
discover that the wrong man was caught and convicted.
18. Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ask: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 719, 770-71 (1974). See
also Possible Procedural Safeguards, supra note 3 (the only type of evidence more damaging
than personal identification is a confession).
19. Note, Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gilbert to Stovall: Lower
Courts Bobble the Ball, 55 MINN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1971).
20. See generally 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2030-34 (3d ed. 1940).
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 2' This determina-
tion would generally be limited to the actual tangible and physical aspects
of identification.2 2 It is in these "pure ' 23 identification cases-in which
guilt is established solely by eyewitness identification-that the jury must
be well appraised of the various factors that can affect eyewitness tes-
timony.
III. Perception and Expert Testimony
In presentation of identification evidence, what the witness repre-
sents as his knowledge is necessarily an impression derived from his own
senses. As Professor Wigmore indicates,
This impression must be gauged by the geographic proximity of
the witness to the event, the length of time involved, and the
existence of proper conditions for the exercise of powers of
observation and perception.
2 4
Wigmore distinguishes between the physical aspects of eyewitness obser-
vation and the concept of perception. This distinction between physical,
ascertainable facts and intangible factors of perception has apparently
been ignored by the courts. Consequently, these latter factors have been
treated as if they were tangible in nature and could be assessed accurately
by the jurors without any special guidance.
A. Intangible Factors of Perception about which an Expert Could
Testify
1. Function of Memory.-The testimony of an eyewitness de-
pends upon memory, which has been called "one of man's most fallible
psychological instrument. "25 The process of memory in an individual is
initiated by a series of perceptions. 26 The expert psychologist could
explain the complicated process and mechanism involved in memory, but
21. United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1968). See also Biggers v.
Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); United
States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But cf. United States v. Kelley, 334
F.Supp. 435, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The sufficiency of identification is generally for the
trier of fact").
22. United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1968). The court suggests that
the judge consider such matters as the lapse of time between the occurrence of the crime
and the first confrontation, the witness' opportunity during the commission of the crime to
identify, the reasons for failure to conduct a lineup or similar technique, and the judge's own
appraisal of the capacity of the identifying witness to observe and remember facial and other
features.
23. The prime concern in eyewitness identification must be with the "pure" identifi-
cation cases. N. SOBEL, supra note 9, at II.
24. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 657-658 (3d ed. 1940).
25. Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 59, 60 (1959). The inadequacies of memory are well recognized and
documented in psychological treatises. See, e.g., RAPAPORT, EMOTION AND MEMORY (2d ed.
1950); WESCHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL OF ADULT INTELLEGENCE (4th ed.
1958).
26. Two types of memory are involved in criminal investigation. Of the two, recogni-
tion and recall, recognition is generally more accurate. Indeed, the use of lineups by criminal
investigators is an implicit acknowledgement of the fallibility of sense perception and
memory. See Quinn, supra note 6, at 146.
such testimony would only tend to confuse the most knowledgeable of
jurors and unduly delay the trial. The better approach would be to have
the expert explain the limitations of perception that may distort memory,
which constitutes the basis of the eyewitness' testimony at trial. This
would enable jurors to appraise the credibility of the positive accusation
made by the identifying witness upon a knowledgeable assessment of the
components of his testimony. The question remains whether these factors
of perception should be brought to the attention of the jury by expert
testimony.
2. Interracial Recognition .- The ability to recognize directly af-
fects an individual's faculty to remember and subsequently identify a
perpetrator of a crime. Unfortunately, the phrase "they all look alike to
me" possesses substantial validity. 27 In United States v. Telfaire,28 for
example, a District of Columbia Circuit case, the court recognized that
the available data, while not exhaustive, supported the view that members
of one race have great difficulty in accurately identifying members of a
different race.
29
This theory, like any other, is not universally accepted. In one study
it was concluded that Blacks recognize white faces with greater accuracy
than black faces. 3° This deviance from the general theory was explained
by the predominant exposure of white faces in the public media.3 1 Thus,
the familiarity of the witness with a particular defendant or race is also an
influential factor in eyewitness perception; something that is quite famil-
iar can be recognized even if it is grossly distorted, while the effect is
reversed with something unfamiliar. 32 This example illustrates the man-
ner in which the various factors of perception can, and do, interact with
one another.
The legal effect of the difficulty of interracial identification is self-
27. See Luce, They All Look Alike to Me, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Nov. 1974) (subjects
of experiment recognized members of their own race most easily).
28. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
29. Id. at 559. Luce, supra note 27, at 106, illustrates this difficulty by relating an
occurrence on a late night talk show that demonstrated just how blind Whites are to black
faces. Muhammad Ali, heavyweight boxing champion, was talking to the host when another
black man suddenly appeared on stage, performed a zany two minute dance routine (ample
time for positive identification), and disappeared. The slight, scattered applause indicated
that only a few of the hundreds of viewers realized the performer was popular comedian
Flip Wilson. Wall, a legal commentator, has similarly noted that it is "a well-established
Isocio-psychological phenomenon' that members of one race recognize each other more
readily than members of another race." P. WALL, EYEWrINESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL
CASES 123 (1965).
30. Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and OtherRaces, 13 J. OF PERS.
& Soc. PSYCH. 330 (1969).
31. Id. at 332.
32. Levine & Tapp, Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to
Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1097 (1973) (even a grossly distorted depiction of an
incumbent President of the United States can be recognized because he is a common subject
and because information about his public activities is widely known). But cf. Luce, supra
note 27, at 108 (simple exposure to other groups does not ensure recognition of individuals
who differ racially from the observer).
evident. Frequently, a witness identifies a criminal defendant who is a
member of another race 33 as a perpetrator of the crime, and such evidence
is customarily accepted by the jury as a factual impression rather than as a
combination of fallible perception components.
Coincident with this possible inability to recognize members of
another race with the same accuracy as members of the same race is
another psychological phenomenon known as "expectancy.' Through
"expectancy" people tend to assign previously categorized characterist-
ics to certain physical attributes. 35 It is well established that these "expec-
tancy" prejudices 36 are stored in the memory and are recalled by indi-
viduals making perceptual judgments such as an eyewitness to a crime
would make. 37 Such influences are important in a criminal situation, as
people tend to perceive inaccurately in accordance with their "expectan-
cy. ",38 Many times an eyewitness unequivocally identifies the defendant
of a different race and the jury acknowledges such testimony without any
consideration of the well-established phenomenon of "expectancy." In
United States v. Telfaire,3 however, the court refused to instruct the jury
33. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concurring
opinion) (a significant percentage of the identifications in the District of Columbia are
interracial).
34. See G. ALLPORT & L. PORTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947).
35. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 25 ("expectancy" or "set" is used by an observer to
make judgments more efficiently).
36. One commentator illustrates these "expectancy" categories with the following
example:
dark skin, of whatever race, is associated with such characteristics as hostility,
dishonesty, unfriendliness, and slyness. It is not too extreme to suggest that in a
threatening situation such as a crime, people may assign to the attacker physical
characteristics associated with aggression, violence, or lawlessness.
SECORD, FACIAL FEATURE, AND INFERENCE PROCESSOR IN INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION, IN
PERSONAL PERCEPTION AND INTROPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 300, 301 (1958).
Phenomena quite similar to "expectancy" are "object belief" and "perceptual blank-
ing." Because of "object belief" a person's attitude about something is the result of his
belief about it. For example, a person with the belief that Blacks are more likely to commit
crimes will experience a generally negative attitude toward Blacks because of this belief,
however unfounded. Levy & House, Perceived Origins of Belief and Determinants of
Expectancy for their Change, 14 J. OF PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 329, 330 (1970). The phenome-
non of "perceptual blanking" results when members of one group are suspicious of those of
another. The suspicious members have negative feelings that may prevent them from
attending to the distinct characteristics of the members of the other group. Luce, supra note
27, at 108.
37. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 26.
38. This phenomenon of expectancy was clearly demonstrated in a classic study by
Gordon Allport of Harvard. In that experiment, the participants were accorded a brief look
at a drawing of several people, including a standing white man and seated black man, on a
subway train. In this drawing the white man had a razor in his hand and was arguing with the
black man. The study results indicated over fifty percent of the observers thought the black
man was brandishing the razor. G. ALLPORT & L. PORTMAN, supra note 34, at 70-72. In
another experiment observers were given a brief glance at a display of twelve playing cards
and then questioned about the number of aces of spades in the display. Most of the
observers responded that there were three aces of spades in the display. Actually there were
five, but two were colored red rather than the more familiar black. It was concluded that
people are so familiar with black aces of spades that they do not waste time looking at the
display carefully and that an eyewitness may similarly report facts that were not present but
that he thinks should have been present. Burkhout, supra note 5, at 25.
39. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
about the danger of "expectancy" in interracial identification. 4° This
indicates the unfamiliarity of the bench, as well as the jury, with the
importance of such considerations. A positive note, however, was ex-
pressed by Chief Judge Bazelon in a concurring opinion in which he
urged that when an issue of an identification of interracial character is
raised, the jury, as a matter of course, should be instructed on the
point.4 This would admittedly alert the jury to be wary of interracial
identification, but without further explanation the jury would not be
conscious of the problems inherent in such identification.
3. Observable Interval .- The eyewitness to a crime usually does
not have an appreciable length of time to observe its occurence since the
perpetrator will obviously attempt to consummate his act as quickly as
possible. 42 The duration of this period of observation can easily be
discerned by an astute inquiry on cross-examination. Such information is
concrete and within the grasp of the jurors, enabling them to attribute the
proper weight to the testimony of the eyewitness who had a limited time
to observe the crime. The length of time in itself, however, is an
incomplete and sketchy consideration without supplemental explanation.
Such explanation could be easily provided by an expert in the field of
perception and sensation.
During the commission of a crime, or at anytime, human capability
is such that people can only perceive a limited amount of simultaneous
transpirations.4 3 In the course of daily activities, this intrinsic limitation
on perception creates no dire problems; but when an eyewitness attempts
to piece together the events surrounding a crime, certain important as-
pects could be neglected, including the discernable characteristics of the
perpetrator. This could be considered a form of "economical percep-
tion." Since it is virtually impossible for any individual to concentrate
and accurately perceive everything that transpires at a particular instant, it
is natural for that individual to register only those specific events that are
necessary." It is, therefore, implicit that an observer may inadvertently
concentrate on what is apparently the most important aspect of a particu-
lar event, but fail to perceive others. It is reasonable to assume that during
the commission of a crime, a stressful situation, the witness may well be
40. Id.
41. Id. at 560. For further discussion of instructions as a discretionary matter regard-
ing eyewitness identification, see note 118 and accompanying text infra.
42. See F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1927); Buckhout, supra
note 5, at 25; Levine & Tapp, supra note 32, at 1097.
43. H. BURTr, supra note 13. Burtt also explains that if the witness has received
warning prior to any occurrence, the probability of an accurate identification is increased.
44. Gibson, The Theory of Information Pickup, CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND RE-
SEARCH IN VISUAL PERCEPTION 677 (R. Haber ed. 1968). See also Buckhout, supra note 5, at
24. The significance of the observed event will also accompany this "economical percep-
tion." The witness might not attach importance to the observed incident and thus will only
remember the occurrence with difficulty.
concentrating on stimuli relevant to his or her own survival rather than the
characteristics of the criminal.
The eyewitness will undoubtedly recall the entire incident itself as
significant, which detracts from his ability to recall particular aspects of
the incident. As a consequence of his recall of the entire incident, the
observer might be placed in a situation in which other factors4 5 involved
in the identification process would encourage an identification of a
criminal defendant. This process of economic perception is not ordinarily
of great importance, but becomes a paramount concern in the context of
determining guilt or innocence.
46
4. Intrinsic Motivation.-An eyewitness to a crime cannot sepa-
rate himself from all motivational influences when he is asked to recall
the events surrounding the commission of the crime. Various motives not
necessarily stimulated by the accused personally or by the particular
criminal incident could affect the accuracy of the eyewitness testimony.
47
Such motives would be very difficult for the jury to glean from even the
most potent cross-examination, since they are intrinsic to the witness.
The eyewitness may believe it necessary to identify a "scapegoat
' 4
to rectify the observed crime. 49 The eyewitness to a crime may want to
exact revenge from the most accessible person for previous criminal
exploits from which he suffered.' It is easily comprehensible that the
"victim's understandable outrage may excite vengeful or spiteful mo-
tives." 51 The revenge motive is often buried in the subconscious of the
witness, however, making it difficult, if not impossible, to discern on
cross-examination, and making misidentification possible.
52
The eyewitness will be solicited to present a recitation of the crime
in the form of an identification and will be motivated to appear capable of
identifying a suspect. In addition, the witness will wish to aid in the
criminal's conviction and thereby live up to the performance of a "good
citizen" in helping society incarcerate the guilty party. 53 Therefore, when
45. See note 48 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of some of these other
factors. See Bern, When Saying is Believing, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (June 1967) (police
persuasion accompanied by the eyewitness' self-persuasion engenders the recall of vital
details that were never observed and that therefore distort the eyewitness account). See also
Tajfel, Social and Cultural Factors in Perception, 3 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(2d ed. Lindzey & Aronson 1969); SEGALL, CAMPBELL, & HERSHOVrrZ, THE INFLUENCE OF
CULTURE ON VISUAL PERCEPTION (1966).
46. Buckhout, supra note 5. at 24.
47. "[T]he emotional balance of the victim or eyewitness is so disturbed by his
extraordinary experience that his powers of perception becomes distorted. .. [and] other
motives" arise. E. BORCHARD, supra note 14, at XIII.
48. This attempt to ascertain a guilty party for every crime committed could be a
direct response to the "war on crime."
49. E. BORCHARD, supra note 14, at XIII.
50. Id.
51. Wade v. United States, 388 U.S. 218, 230 (1967).
52. See E. BORCHARD, supra note 14; E. GARDNER, supra note 15; Hammelman &
Williams, Identification Parader-l 1963 CRIM. L. REV. 545, 546.
53. Levine & Tapp, supra note 32, at 1115.
a witness experiences even a faint glimmer of recognition, a natural
tendency will be to do everything in his power to reinforce this recogni-
tion and reach a positive identification.' 4 A witness is often motivated to
make even an incorrect identification rather than fall short of a precon-
ceived notion of the "competent witness."
55
Other motives that can affect an eyewitness identification prompted
the United States Supreme Court 6 to adopt safeguards that would deter
the potential pretrial suggestiveness of police procedures. 57 An eyewit-
ness is often motivated to adhere to any identification, however mistaken,
once it is made. 58 In fact, the witness' testimony will tend to become
more definite and more complete as prosecution of the case continues
until the testimony at trial is so positive that it appears unquestionably
valid. 9 The witness probably will not be consciously lying, but will be
unaware of distorting his memory to become more plausible or credible.60
This influence upon the motivation of an eyewitness should be
clearly exposed to the jurors. Obviously, the jury is not present when the
original and possibly highly uncertain identification is made and, there-
fore, cannot appraise the certainty of the later identification. If, however,
the jury were instructed upon these matters by a qualified expert, the
54. Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36, 40 (5th Cir. 1967). In this case the eyewitness thought
she recognized the defendant, but indicated to the detective she could not be sure unless she
saw him wearing a hat. After the defendant was required to put on a hat, the witness was still
not sure and, therefore, requested the detective to have the defendant say something. After
the defendant spoke, the witness was still uncertain. The police then required the defendant
to don a jacket and walk past the eyewitness. Finally a "positive" identification was made.
After causing the police to engage in this prolonged procedure, a witness will be very
reluctant to incur the displeasure of the officer by later recanting.
55. One experiment indicates that eighty percent of the subject witnesses tried to pick
a suspect in a live purse-snatching incident followed by two lineups, even though most
witnesses were uncertain. An interesting aspect was that the "good witnesses," as deter-
mined by the experiment, expressed less confidence in identification than the "bad wit-
nesses."
56. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
57. Any test of identification is obviously a social interaction, and there are many
influences in police identification procedures that can motivate an eyewitness to make an
inaccurate identification. The manner in which an eyewitness' recollection is eventually
tested can have a very influential effect on the resulting identification. See note 8 supra;
Doob & Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-Partial Remembering, I J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 287 (1973); Grano, supra note 18.
58. It is a commonly recognized theory that once the witness has made a decision, any
decision, it is doubtful that he will later change his mind in open court even if he has been
given reason to doubt the accuracy of his initial choice. Note, Lineup: Right to Counsel, 45
WASH. L. REV. 202 (1970). See also J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT
(1966); Hammelmann & Williams, supra note 52, at 545.
59. Law and Justice, INTELLECT (Dec. 1974). See also Buckhout, supra note 5, at 27.
This nurturing and fabrication of a more positive identification by the criminal procedure
can have dire results. See United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 527 (3d Cir. 1971), for a
dissertation on the "positiveness" of the witness' in-court identification. The court stressed
that, "If there is a high degree of precision and certainty in [the witness'] expression...
the statement of the witness may be regarded as a statement of fact." So the build-up of a
positive identification by the witness through the criminal justice procedure has an influen-
tial effect. See also note 55 supra for a revealing commentary on the "positiveness" of
identification.
60. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 27.
rendered verdict would be more reflective of a careful weighing of all the
factors and consonant with the underlying ideals of our criminal justice
system.
5. Stress or Excitement.-The stress a witness experiences during
a criminal incident can directly affect the accuracy of his perception. The
anxiety inherent in such a situation causes a loss of abstract abilities
generally and, more specifically, a loss of ability in intellectual function
and visual coordination. 6' Therefore, the witness himself is a primary
source of unreliability even if trained to withstand stress. 62 Moreover, the
stress induced by a crime may "leave a witness wide open to sugges-
tion," 63 and, because of the nature of eyewitness testimony procedure in
our criminal justice system, such suggestive influences abound in the
prosecution of a case.
64
When the jury first confronts the witness in an austere and tranquil
courtroom it has no indication of any stress he may have felt at the time of
the crime. In such an atmosphere witnesses may be very relaxed and
convincing in their recollection of the circumstances surrounding the
crime. The jury should be made aware of the typical stress situation
induced by the occurrence of a criminal act so that these effects can be
considered in evaluating the witness' testimony.
6. Predisposition of Eyewitness. -Psychological research has in-
dicated, and experimental psychologists agree, that what is already in the
mind of the observer will greatly determine perception. 65 In learning to
perceive, one necessarily learns to perceive selectively and develop
categories for reception.66 The ability to perceive entails the coding of
stimuli into the appropriate categories. 67 These pre-existing categories
will vary with different individuals, and, consequently, the accuracy of
perception will also vary.' The process of perception is known as
"constructive" rather than "reproductive. "' The perceiver constructs
61. E. BIER, THE EFFECT OF INDUCED ANXIETY ON FLEXIBILITY OF INTELLECTUAL
FUNCTIONING (Psych. Monographs No. 326, 1952). Other obvious effects of stress include
increases in the heart rate, breathing rate, and adrenalin level. Research has demonstrated
that an observer or eyewitness under stress is less capable of rendering an accurate account
and perceiving details. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 25.
62. Buckhout relates an experiment with Air Force personnel (usually considered
highly trained and able to withstand extreme stress) that indicated they become poor
observers under stress. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 25.
63. Smith, The Fallibility of Eyewitness Testimony, 1 AM. J. OF POLICE Sci. 487, 493
(1930). See also H. BuRTr, supra note 13.
64. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
65. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 44, at 662; Treisman & Geffen, Selective Attention:
Perception or Response, INFORMATION-PROCESSING APPROACHES TO VISUAL PERCEPTION 373
(R. Haber ed. 1969).
66. Gibson, supra note 44, at 662.
67. Bruner, On Perceptual Readiness, in CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND RESEARCH IN
VISUAL PERCEPTION 634 (R. Haber ed. 1968). See also BRUNER, GOODNOW, & AUSTIN, A
STUDY OF THINKING (1956).
68. Bruner, supra note 67, at 662.
69. Levine & Tapp, supra note 32, at 1130.
the recollection of a particular event from his individual categories.
All the influences on perception that affect this "constructive proc-
ess" function consciously and subconsciously at the instant of percep-
tion, as well as during any pretrial procedures. When the eyewitness is
called to the witness stand, however, he is expected to perform the
function of identification in a "reproductive" manner and to duplicate the
criminal incident he perceived. 70
The expert who has acquired expertise in the study of perception
could succinctly explain the effects that the predisposition of an individu-
al would have on his perception and the resultant possible inaccuracies
and, thus, facilitate intelligent reasoning by the jury. The more able a jury
is to determine reasonably the guilt of a presumably innocent man, the
more the identification procedure will remain true to the ideals of our
criminal justice system. The expert, if utilized effectively, could provide
valuable insight and necessary safeguards to what otherwise might very
well be an inaccurate determination of guilt.
B. The Role of the Expert
1. General Background for the Use of Expert Testimony.-The
expert traditionally provides valuable insight and explanation in an area
that would otherwise be obscure.7 Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide,
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of the fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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The emphasis in expert estimony is on the promotion of the jury's
ability to make a final factual decision in a knowledgeable manner. The
federal rules, in recognition of the aid experts can provide, are designed
to admit more evidence, subject to the discretion of the judge. 73 Whenev-
er the circumstances or facts can be sufficiently described to the jury so
that their bearing on the issue can be adequately ascertained without
special knowledge or training, expert testimony is unnecessary. 74 The
expert, however, can offer inferences from these facts that a jury would
not be able to draw. Therefore, the information that an expert can
70. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
71. "An intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult or impossible without the
application of some scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge." FED. R. EVID.
702, Advisory Committee's Note. The assumption implicit in this quotation is that an expert
witness has a very important and pertinent role in our justice system.
72. Id.
73. Powell & Bums, A Discussion of the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 GONZAGA
L. REV. 1 (1972).
74. Kuhn v. Ligonier Val. R.R., 255 Pa. 445, 100 A. 142 (1917). See also Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952).
contribute must be related to a field of knowledge or expertise that is
beyond the purview of the average person.
75
The courts in general apply a fairly uniform test to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony. 76 Two basic requirements must be
fulfilled. The subject of the inference (i.e., the testimony of the expert)
must be so distinctly related to some science, profession, business, or
occupation that it is beyond the knowledge or scope of the average
layman.77 In addition, the expert witness must have expertise or knowl-
edge in the particular scientific field to ensure that his testimony will aid
the trier of fact in his search for truth.78 Courts will surely apply these
guidelines in varying fashions, but they all use the same basic criteria.
79
The fundamental and paramount concern with expert testimony, as it
should be with all facets of the criminal justice system, is a desire to give
the jury the most assistance to assure a truthful conclusion.
The admissibility of expert testimony is within the trial court's
discretion, and the exercise of this discretion has not been interfered with
except upon a finding that it has been prejudicial.8" Prejudice can easily
result when the eyewitness positively identifies8' the criminal defendant
as the perpetrator and the jury is unaware of the factors that could have
affected the eyewitness' perception during the initial observation of the
crime.8 2 A key consideration is that the jury could receive appreciable
help from the expert witness-not that the jury could decide without
75. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. 1972).
76. Powell & Burn, supra note 73, at 16.
77. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
78. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United States,'307 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146
(9th Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Newsome, 462 Pa. 106, 337 A.2d 904 (1975); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 445 Pa. 98, 283
A.2d 58 (1971); MCCORMICK, supra note 75.
79. The Ninth Circuit's test, which incorporates the criteria, is as follows:
Whether the court below erred in excluding the alleged expert testimony
regarding the credibility of eyewitness identification, therefore, must be decided in
reference to the four outlined criteria: (1) qualified expert; (2) proper subject; (3)
conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and (4) probative value
compared to prejudicial effect.
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973).
In United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the prejudicial effect of
the proffered testimony was considered.
The countervailing considerations most often noted to exclude what is rele-
vant and material evidence are the risk that admissions will (I) require undue
consumption of time, (2) create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, (3) or unfairly and harmfully
surprising a party who has not had a reasonable opportunity to anticipate the
evidence submitted. Scientific or expert testimony particularly courts the second
danger because of its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.
Id. at 894.
80. See, e.g., State v. Perryman, 520 S.W.2d 126, 130 (Mo. App. 1975). See also
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Vineyard, 497 S.W.2d 821
(Mo. App. 1973); State v. Baker, 490 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App. 1973); State v. Spry, 87 S.D.
318, 207 N.W.2d 504 (1973); State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
81. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
82. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
expert help.8 3
At one time the state of psychological research on the subject of
perception was not "beyond the grasp of an ordinary layman," but the
contemporary status of the art is extremely complex. 84 This dramatic
advance in psychology should be recognized by the legal community as a
possible new horizon in improving a procedure that has resulted in
numerous "wrongful convictions."- 85 The heavy reliance of jurors on
eyewitness testimony indicates their misconception of perception, and, in
this sense, the factors of unreliability are not within the awareness of the
layman. The perception expert could, therefore, provide valuable infor-
mation from a sophisticated and complex scientific field that would
undoubtedly assist the trier of fact in the search for truth.
Rules of admissibility are designed to maximize the truth-finding
effort and are tempered by practical concerns for the expedient adminis-
tration of the criminal justice system. Therefore, the exercise of discre-
tion by the court in allowing expert testimony necessarily involves the
balancing of aid to the truth-finding process against ancillary practical
concerns such as cost, time, and the expedience of justice (ancillary in
that ideally the criminal justice system attempts to reach the truth as its
ultimate goal).
In an eyewitness identification case, there is often an abundance of
evidence to corroborate the eyewitness testimony already pointing to the
guilt of the accused.86 In such an instance, these ancillary concerns may
outweigh the need for the testimony of a perception expert. Conversely,
many judges agree that there is always concern when guilt or innocence
turns solely on identification testimony. 87 In these "pure'"'" eyewitness
identification cases the ancillary concerns should be subordinate to the
necessity of presenting all the pertinent facts to the jury, including an
explanation of the factors that could affect the eyewitness' initial percep-
tion. Even when several eyewitnesses identify a criminal defendant, the
jury should be appraised of these factors by an expert. Merely because
two eyewitnesses testify to the same circumstances does not make their
testimony fact; 89 there may be other motives for their testimony. 9 Wit-
83. See Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185, 249 A.2d 112 (1969); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md.
24, 169 A.2d 661 (1961); Terry v. State, 34 Md. App. 99, 366 A.2d 65 (1976). But cf. United
States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224,
352 A.2d 30 (1976). Pennsylvania law allows expert testimony only when the subject matter
is beyond the knowledge of the average layman.
84. See note I I and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
86. N. SOBEL, supra note 9, at 11.
87. Id. at 13.
88. See note 23 supra.
89. WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 339-40 (2d ed. 193 1).
[Wihen the observation is that of one person alone, or even when more testify but
have accidentally the same amount of knowledge and hence have made the same
mistake, and no contradiction appears, we suppose ourselves to possess the pre-
cise truth, confirmed by several witnesses, and we argue merrily on the basis of it.
In the meantime we quite forget that contradictions are our salvation from the
trusting acceptance of untruth-and that the absence of contradiction means, as a
rule, the absence of a starting point for further examination.
90. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
nesses may alter their beliefs unconsciously to conform to those of others
because of either a lack of conformity in their own perception or a desire
to reconcile contradictory aspects of perception.
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2. " Qualification of Expert on Eyewitness Perception.-If the sub-
ject of the expert testimony is not within the "grasp of the ordinary
layman'' 92 and the ancillary concerns are outweighed by its potential
assistance, then the expert may testify if he qualifies. The qualifications
enabling an expert to testify are within the discretion of the court.93
Therefore, variance between jurisdictions is inevitable.
In recognition of the relatively complex and evolutionary nature of
this field, the court should strive for a higher level of expertise than is
ordinarily accepted for expert testimony. First, the expert should possess
an advanced degree in psychology from an accredited institution. 4 Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the proposed expert should have demon-
strated a high degree of competency in this specific psychological area
attained through extensive research or practical experimentation in study-
ing such psychological phenomena. 95 However one may succeed in
qualifying the expert, most courts still adhere to the traditional methods
used to test the reliability of a witness' identification.
IV. Traditional Methods of Eliciting Perception Factors and Judicial
Treatment of Experts on Perception
The courts, acting inconsistently with their continued recognition of
the fallibility of eyewitness testimony, have persistently refused to admit
expert testimony on the factors contributing to the unreliability of such
eyewitness evidence. 96 This refusal assumes the form of an implicit
overestimation of and reliance on the ability of the criminal justice system
to reach the same goals that could be attained by the use of an expert. This
reliance attaches not only to the procedures of identification but to the
ability of the defense in a criminal trial to attack the accuracy of such
identification.
91. In 1955 a now classic experiment was reported that demonstrated an individual's
desire to conform. Seven observers were shown two lines and asked to say which one was
shorter. Six observers were actually participating in the experiment with the experimenter
and they all said that the objectively longer line was the shorter. The seventh person was on
the spot. The majority of the naive subjects said that the long line was the short one-in the
face of reality and in spite of the fact that alone they would have no trouble giving the
correct answer. Such influences could be present in the identification process through police
interrogation and other modes. Asch, Opinion and Social Pressure, SCIENTIFic AMERICAN
(Nov. 1955). See also note 44 supra.
92. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 80 supra.
94. Interview with Dr. Stephen B. Coslett, Professor of Psychology, Dickinson
College, Carlisle, Pa. (Sept. 8, 1977).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971).
A. Ability of Defense Counsel
1. Cross-examination.--Our legal system places a heavy reliance
on the "test of cross-examination" and the ability of defense counsel,
through its use, to ascertain the truth. 97 This places the responsibility on
defense counsel during cross-examination to "inquire into the eyewit-
ness' opportunity and capacity for observation, his attention and interest,
and his distraction or division of attention."
98
Any deficiency of the senses, such as deafness, or color
blindness or defects of other senses which would substantially
lessen the ability to perceive the facts which the witness pur-
ports to have observed, should of course be provable to attack
the credibility of the witness . . . upon cross-examination
... .Probably the limits and weaknesses of human powers of
perception should be studied more widely by Judges and law-
yers in the interest of a more accurate and objective administra-
tion of justice.'
Professor McCormick obviously recognized the distinction between the
factors that can reasonably be ascertained on cross-examination and the
intangible factors that can affect eyewitness identification testimony. 10
Implicit in this recognition is the acknowledgement that regardless of the
effectiveness of cross-examination, these intangible factors of perception
will not be adequately weighed by the jury without a full explanation and
understanding of their effect. The courts, however, consistently assume
that even these highly complex and scientific factors will be brought out
by effective and probing cross-examination.
In United States v. Collins, 10 for example, the court failed to even
consider whether the subject of perception was proper for expert tes-
timony or whether the expert himself was properly qualified to provide
testimony on the subject." ° Rather, the court held that the limitations of
perception would be established by defense counsel on cross-examination
and consequently drawn to the attention of the jury without expert
testimony. 03 The fallacy of this assertion is apparent from the court's
delineation of the factors that might be elicited on cross-examination. The
court spoke of
factors, such as undue stress on the viewer and environmental
conditions, which would tend to render a given eyewitness
account unreliable and the possibility or probability that the
account in question is inaccurate. 104
The court noted environmental conditions (i.e., physical and tangible
97. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973).
98. Id. at 1153.
99. MCCORMICK, supra note 75, at § 45. See also Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208
S.E.2d 850 (1974); accord, Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 20 Ga. 600 (1856); Loomis v. State, 78
Ga. App. 366, 51 S.E.2d 33 (1948).
100. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
101. 395 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
102. Id. at 636. See also People v. Lawson, 551 P.2d 206 (Colo. App. 1976).
103. 395 F. Supp. at 636.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
factors of perception that are easily brought out by cross-examination), °5
but ignored the intangible factors of perception---complex psychological
variables that do not lend themselves to the traditional methods for
ascertaining the truth. 106 The jury can be made aware of these elements
only by careful explanation and cannot be expected to be familiar with the
variables of perception from prior experience.
2. Investigation by Defense Counsel.-Defense counsel, by thor-
ough investigation, can ascertain some factors that challenge the reliabili-
ty of the eyewitness. In one such case, a police officer, who observed the
defendant in a doorway approximately 120 feet away, testified that he had
seen the defendant, who was black, shoot the victim. 107 Investigation
revealed, however, that at the time of the crime, the doorway was so
poorly lit that a person's silhouette could hardly be seen, let alone any
distinct characteristics of the defendant's face."08 The eyewitness' error
could easily be discovered, described, and understood by the jury because
of the physical impossibility of adequate observation. When the eyewit-
ness' mistake results from intangible psychological characteristics, how-
ever, defense counsel will have a difficult task in detecting such factors
by even the most thorough cross-examination or investigation.
B. Consideration by Courts
1. Role of the Jury.-Exclusion of a perception expert's explana-
tion of the inherent deficiencies of eyewitness testimony is traditionally
justified by the rationale that his explanation would invade the province
of the jury." Since identification evidence is offered as proof of guilt,
105. A study conducted by Gardner, a trial lawyer in the 1930's, concerning the
deficiencies of eyewitness perception attempted to provide other trial lawyers with an
adequate method of cross-examination to illustrate such deficiencies. The study suggests
that the most effective method of testing the accuracy of eyewitness perception is cross-
examination, but concluded by urging that more exploration and experimentation be
conducted to better evaluate eyewitnesses. Thus, even the most competent defense attorney
who is cognizant of these fallacies may not succeed in presenting them before the court and
to the jury. The dilemma is compounded in the situation in which the attorney is poorly
versed in the psychological aspects of perception. It is also likely that by the time
the eyewitness testifies at trial, a conceived perception will have been so reinforced that the
factors that introduce unreliability would be impossible to ascertain regardless of the
intensity of cross-examination. Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18
CORNELL L.Q. 391, 409 (1933). This study of memory indicated to trial lawyers that faulty
perception may be attacked most efficiently along three distinct lines: (1) The original
perception of the event or details may have been defective; (2) The details may not have
been fixated, may have been forgotten, or imagination may have altered, added to, or
changed them; (3) The original perception may have become interwoven with or altered by
suggestion from outside sources. Tests directed at perception of the witness, his retentive-
ness, imagination, caution, bias, and suggestability will be most fruitful.
106. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
107. Buckhout, supra note 5, at 25.
108. Id. This conclusion was supported by the use of an instrument that revealed that
the light falling on the eye at the scene amounted to less than one-fifth of the light from a
candle. The defense could, and did, present light readings to demonstrate that a positive
identification was not very likely. The jury observed the scene, conducted its own mock
incident, and subsequently acquitted the defendant.
109. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974). The defense proposed to
have an expert testify to the general problems of identification and to the difficulties in this
particular instance. The court refused to allow such testimony, concluding that any such
the accuracy of the identification is an issue of fact for the jury.ll° An
expert who merely provides supplemental or clarifying information does
not, however, invade the jury's province. Rather, he helps the jury assess
more accurately the ultimate issue of positive eyewitness identification.
Even if an expert's opinion did embrace an ultimate issue, this would not
serve as a valid basis for the exclusion of his testimony, at least not in
federal courts. II The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that such an
opinion should not be excluded on those grounds alone.
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Jurors are instructed to base their decisions on the facts and evidence
presented at trial. It is highly unlikely that they would consciously be
concerned with anything but the eyewitness identification at the trial, and
consequently would not try to determine the factors that contributed to or
affected the original perception by the eyewitness. "All too frequently, in
eyewitness identification. . . the defense cannot reconstruct the scene of
the identification, " 113 and the jury relies solely on the convincing posi-
tive identification made in court.
Admittedly, the final question of the eyewitness' credibility lies with
the jury, but if the jury is not able to adequately "grasp" the factors that
influence perception, then any answer will suffer from insufficiency. It is
this insufficiency that an expert in perception could remedy.
2. Court Instruction .- Some courts realize that in the wake of the
Wade trilogy," 4 "[t]he need for jury instructions on identification is
imperative." 11 5 The court in United States v. Telfairet16 emphasized this
position:
The presumption of innocence that safeguards the common
law system must be a premise that is realized in instruction and
not merely a promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have
pointed out the importance of and need for a special instruction
on the key issue of identification, which emphasizes to the jury
testimony would invade the province of the jury. Id. at 150; accord, People v. Alvarez, 530
P.2d 506 (Colo. 1975); Goodwyn v. Goodwyn, 20 Ga. 600 (1856).
110. N. SOBEL, supra note 9, at 155.
Il1. FED. R. EVID. 704 provides, "Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." The Advisory Committee's notes stress the approach to expert
opinion is to admit it when helpful to the trier of fact, and the so-called "ultimate issue" rule
is specifically abolished.
112. Id. See also State v. Ellis, 89 N.M. 194, 548 P.2d 1212 (1976).
113. Comment, Regulation and Enforcement of Pretrial Identification Procedures, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1969).
114. See note 7 supra.
115. Maklin v. United States, 409 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also BRITISH
CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT: EVIDENCE 116-21 (1972). The
British committee proposed legislation requiring judges to warn the jury of the special need
for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of identification
testimony. The requirement would apply whenever the prosecution's case depends wholly
or substantially on the correctness of identification, even in cases involving more than one
eyewitness.
116. 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
the need for finding that the circumstances of the identification
are convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. "
7
The need for special sua sponte instruction on identification testimony has
not, however, been universally accepted.
In Telfaire, the court referred to instructions suggested in United
States v. Barber,11 8 but noted that they were not set forth as manda-
tory. 119 As long as instruction on these matters is discretionary, there will
be situations in which the jury will not be made specifically aware of the
unreliability of eyewitness testimony. This was the situation in 1973
when the court in United States v. Amara1120 relied on Barber in refusing
to require such an instruction to the jury.121 It was assumed that the jury
could assess the eyewitness testimony adequately without any special
instruction.
Assuming the courts were compelled in any eyewitness identifica-
tion case to give instructions sua sponte concerning the possible deficien-
cies of eyewitness testimony, such a solution would still be inadequate.
The instructions typically given 122 and the model instructions suggested
in Telfaire'23 possess some common threads that indicate their inade-
quacies. The instructions include, as is customary in any criminal trial,
the admonition that the jury be convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt"
of the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. This
practice coincides with the well-established presumption of innocence in
the criminal justice system. To reach a conclusion beyond a reasonable
doubt, the instructions also charge the jury to consider individually all of
the possible influences on the eyewitness identification, including any
factors of original perception.
These instructions, in light of psychological research, are seriously
deficient. They admittedly warn the jury to be aware of and consider the
factors of perception. Such consideration, however, is missing an integral
element if the jury does not know what these factors of perception, both
tangible and intangible, are. Yet, the courts have adamantly refused to
permit experts to articulate the missing element, and continue to allow the
jury to flounder with unknown concepts in assessing the accuracy of
eyewitness identification.
117. Id.-at 555.
118. 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir. 1971). The court in Telfaire, recognizing the need for
instructions appropriate to identification cases, suggested model instructions. 469 F.2d at
558.
119. 469 F.2d at 557. The court suggested, however, that a failure to use the instruc-
tions would pose a risk in future cases that should not be ignored.
120. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
121. Id. at 1151; accord, United States v. Evans, 484 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Moss, 410 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1969); State v. Chambers, 104 Ariz. 247, 451 P.2d 27
(1969).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 528 (3d Cir. 1971).
123. 469 F.2d at 558.
V. Conclusion
The criminal justice system should constantly be striving and experi-
menting for improvement. 124 One aspect of trial procedure in dire need of
reform is the current treatment of eyewitness testimony. As an alternative
to the practice of leaving the court and jury unassisted, the presentation of
testimony by a court-appointed expert qualified in the subjects of mem-
ory, perception, and sensation would certainly enhance the fact-finding
process. The existence of the court's power to call expert witnesses has
been acknowledged on several occasions.' 25
Not only would such a system deter expert-shopping, it would also
guarantee every criminal defendant, regardless of resources, the same
safeguards against the deficiencies of eyewitness perception. The expert
would be called when the court, within specified limitations that still
allow the exercise of sound discretion, deems it necessary. One exception
to the court's discretion would be in the "pure" 126 identification cases in
which there is no corroborative evidence other than eyewitness identifica-
tion. In such cases the jury must be made familiar with the complicated
factors that could have affected the eyewitness' perception of the criminal
event.
The expert would limit his testimony to the general effect of the
factors that influence eyewitness perception.' 27 The expert would not,
however, be permitted to venture an opinion whether the particular
eyewitness is accurate. This limitation is certainly necessary since the
perceptual skills of witnesses differ 128 and are frequently untested by the
testifying expert. 2 9 Such a restriction would dispense with any concern
that the expert is deciding the credibility of the witness, a matter exclu-
sively within the jury's province.'3 Rather, the expert would be assisting
124. Campbell, Legal Reform As Experiments, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 217 (1971).
125. See, e.g., Scott v. Spanger Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1962); FED. R. EVID.
706; Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witnesses, 29 S.
CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956); Note, Trial Judge's Use of His Powerto Call Witnesses-An Aid to
Adversary Presentation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1957); Note, Judicial Authority to Call
Expert Witnesses, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 375 (1957).
126. See note 23 supra.
127. See FED. R. EVID. 702. The advisory committee's note stresses that the rule
recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or
other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts.
128. Interview with Dr. Stephen B. Coslett, supra note 94.
129. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, -, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974). The expert testimony
would have been based exclusively on hypothetical questions without knowledge of or an
interview with the eyewitness. The court held there was a total lack of, or insufficient,
observation of the assailed witness by the expert. See also Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485
S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1972), in which the court exhibited the same concern. The expert was to
testify generally about the ability of people to observe accurately and relate what they had
seen. He was prepared to testify to the general inaccuracy of eyewitnesses and the factors
that contribute to such inaccuracy. The foundation of such testimony was the result of tests
administered under controlled conditions. The court assumed the expert would be attacking
the credibility of the individual eyewitness and stressed that he had not administered any
tests to any of the eyewitnesses in the case. Accord, United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
130. See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 165 S.E.2d 150 (1968); Montgomery v.
State, 224 Ga. 845, 165 S.E.2d 145 (1968).
the trier-of-fact by furnishing additional facts that would help assess the
eyewitness' credibility. 13' Moreover, the time consumed by expert tes-
timony on perception is a minor concern, "for [in] the vast majority of
crimes . . . eyewitness identification plays a minor role."1 32 The adop-
tion of these suggestions, therefore, would not unduly burden the crimi-
nal justice system, 13 3 but would provide necessary and impressive
reform.
Law and psychology are closely related even though the lawyer and
psychologist have different objectives. 13' Courts have long admitted
expert testimony regarding a person's sanity. Similarly psychology can
illuminate the processes of eyewitness perception, although it cannot be
the sole remedy for eyewitness misidentification. The risks of mistaken
identification can never be eliminated,135 for criminal justice is adminis-
tered by human beings and errors in judgment are inevitable. The possi-
bility of error should not, however, defeat the search for a "better and
-fairer" process. A system historically and ideally dedicated to protecting
the innocent from wrongful convictions should experiment and reform in
every manner to minimize the risks.
BRIAN M. ADDISON
131. See note 127 supra.
132. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 37, 38 (1967). See also
Levine & Tapp, supra note 32, at 1086.
133. The use of an expert on the factors of perception in the "pure" identification
cases would not involve a large number of cases. See N. SOBEL, supra note 9, at 11, in
which the author notes that few "pure" identification cases arise.
134. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1961).
135. Grano, supra note 18, at 798.

